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Abstract
Building effective state institutions before introducing democracy is widely pre-
sumed to improve different development outcomes. We discuss the assumptions that
this prominent ‘stateness-first’ argument rests upon and how extant studies fail to
correctly specify the counter-factual conditions required to test the argument. In ex-
tension, we subject the argument to three sets of tests focused on economic develop-
ment as the outcome, leveraging new measures of democracy and state institutional
features for almost 180 polities with time series extending back to 1789. First, we run
standard panel regressions with interactions between state capacity and democracy.
Second, we employ coarsened exact matching, specifying and testing different rele-
vant counter-factuals embedded in the stateness-first argument. Finally, we employ
sequencing methods to identify historically common sequences of institutional change,
and use these sequences as growth predictors. We do not find any evidence supporting
the stateness-first argument in either of these tests.
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1 Introduction
Several studies point to how ‘good institutions’, such as democracy (Acemoglu et al.,
2014) or a rule-following and capable state bureaucracy (Evans and Rauch, 1999), enhance
economic development. While the presence or absence of particular institutions remains the
core focus in the literature studying institutions and development, many prominent argu-
ments focus on the sequence in which particular institutions are introduced. Perhaps the
most widely regarded type of ‘sequencing explanation’ holds that building effective state
institutions before introducing democracy has beneficial effects on a variety of outcomes
(see, for instance, Huntington, 1968; Shefter, 1993; Zakaria, 2003; Mansfield and Snyder,
1995, 2007; Fukuyama, 2007, 2014a; D’Arcy and Nistotskaya, 2017). According to this view,
the state-before-democracy pathway leads to ‘Denmark’—the metaphor for an economically
prosperous and politically stable country used by Fukuyama (2014a). Conversely, intro-
ducing democratic institutions, such as competitive elections and universal franchise, before
effective and capable state institutions are in place, is often considered a path to political in-
stability, violence, clientelism, and a stagnant economy. While this ‘stateness-first’ argument
is plausible, it faces three major hurdles before it can be accepted as firm knowledge.
First, the argument is often presented in an insufficiently precise manner. In particular,
studies often fail to outline the exact counter-factual institutional configurations and devel-
opment patterns they have in mind when arguing for the benefits of building state capacity
before democratization. This, in turn, presents difficulties for interpreting the evidence in fa-
vor of the conjecture. We propose that while extant case studies (e.g., Fukuyama, 2014a) and
cross-national regressions (e.g., D’Arcy and Nistotskaya, 2017) may provide evidence that
strong state institutions affect development outcomes, they do not provide evidence directly
pertaining to the more complex sequencing explanation. Second, the stateness-first argu-
ment rests on several strong assumptions for which there are plausible counter-arguments.
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, the stateness-first argument has not been systemat-
ically analyzed through the same types of stringent testing as many other propositions on
the determinants of development. There are good reasons for why extant studies have not
pursued such tests, notably the lack of extensive time-series data on relevant institutional
features. But it remains unclear whether the stateness-first argument is valid, even if many
scholars, policy makers, and others find it to be plausible.
This paper examines the relationship between stateness-first sequences of institutional
development and economic growth, one of the key outcomes that stateness-first sequences
are purported to explain. The paper makes two contributions. The first one is theoretical,
as we specify and evaluate critical assumptions and counter-arguments, and elaborate on
the specific observable implications following from the argument. While our empirical tests
focus on economic growth—we report more preliminary results for alternative outcomes of
interest in Appendix D—these theoretical insights draw on and speak to studies on other
proposed consequences of stateness-first sequences, including regime stability, civil conflict,
and broader human development.
We also make a second, empirical contribution. We systematically evaluate different as-
sumptions and implications following from the stateness-first argument, focusing on economic
growth as the dependent variable. To this end, we use data from the Varieties of Democracy
(V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al., 2017), including the new Historical V-Dem data (Knutsen
et al., 2017), which extends relevant V-Dem indicators back in time to 1789. These extensive
time series allow us to track institutional developments throughout the course of ‘modern
history’, covering important periods of state building and democratization in different re-
gions of the world. In order to test different assumptions and implications of the argument,
we employ a multi-approach strategy to testing. Specifically, we run panel regressions esti-
mating how state capacity and democracy interact in affecting development. Next, we test
several matching models that compare, for instance, high- and low-state capacity countries
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that undergo democratization episodes. Finally, we employ sequencing analysis, classify-
ing different historical patterns to investigate how common institutional sequences predict
growth. Across all specifications, we find scant evidence to support the stateness-first ar-
gument. Some specifications even suggest that democracy-before-state sequences enhance
economic development relative to stateness-first sequences.
We start out by introducing sequencing theories of development and the stateness-first
argument in particular. Next, we critically discuss the argument’s core assumptions and
plausible counter-arguments. We then elaborate on the implications that follow from the
argument and how these might be tested . After outlining the data, we introduce and present
results from, respectively, panel regressions, matching models, and analyses on institutional
sequences. In the conclusion, we summarize our findings and discuss how they may inform—
or at least temper—normative debates and prescriptive policy advice on the (un)desirability
of promoting democracy in countries with weak state institutions. We also highlight avenues
for future research, emphasizing that similar, careful studies are needed in order to systemat-
ically assess whether stateness-first sequences have different effects on alternative outcomes
of interest such as regime stability, civil war, and human development.
2 Critically evaluating the ‘stateness-first’ argument
2.1 Putting state capacity before democracy
Country rankings for important economic and political development outcomes, including
democracy, bureaucratic quality, income level, and human development, often identify the
same sets of countries as high- and low achievers. Why is it that some countries, such as
Denmark, have followed favorable development trajectories, whereas others have not? Mul-
tiple deeper determinants of both political and economic development have been suggested,
notably geography, climate, and natural resource endowment (Diamond, 1997; Sachs, 2005;
Pomeranz, 2000), culture and ideology (Weber, 2002; Landes, 1998), as well as demographic
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and genetic factors (Galor, 2012; Spolaore, 2013). Yet, one predominant view highlights
the role of institutions in influencing development outcomes (North, 1990; Acemoglu, 2001;
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Rodrik et al., 2004). Despite the prominence of the insti-
tutionalist view, there remains no real consensus on exactly which institutions matter for
spurring development, with suggestions ranging from institutions that guard against the
concentration of political power and protect property rights (Acemoglu, 2001; De Long and
Schleifer, 1993; North, 1990) to the establishment of a capable, impartial, and rule-following
bureaucracy (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Fukuyama, 2014a; Rothstein, 2011).
An elaborate version of the institutionalist view on development highlights not only the
importance of specific institutions, but also the order in which they are introduced. We
term such explanations sequencing explanations of development. Sequencing explanations
of successful democratization, for example, propose that certain institutional (and other)
preconditions need to be in place prior to the establishment of democracy. Following de-
colonization processes in Africa and Asia after WWII, observations of newly democratized
countries in which elected leaders abused their powers, or in which competing interests de-
generated into conflicts, led prominent scholars to argue that the successful implementation
of democracy depends on the relative timing of specific events and reforms (e.g., Huntington,
1968; Dahl, 1971). One notion is that the influence of interest groups under democracy can
be detrimental to economic reform and modernization, such that popular pressures need
to be restrained and channeled in the wake of a modernizing economy (Huntington, 1968;
Wintrobe, 1998). Another variant of sequencing theory focuses on the need for establish-
ing ‘liberal’ institutional features early on, citing the introduction of civil liberties prior to
suffrage expansion as a condition that supports democratic deepening and prevents the emer-
gence of illiberal democracies (Marshall and Bottomore, 1949; Møller and Skaaning, 2013;
Zakaria, 2003).
Yet others have argued that a ‘postponed transition’ to democracy, after rule of law or a
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rule-following, high-capacity bureaucratic apparatus have been achieved, will make countries
less likely to experience conflict and violence, and better able to mitigate patronage or other
bad outcomes associated with a rushed democratic transition (see, e.g., D’Arcy and Nistot-
skaya, 2017; Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, 2007; Shefter, 1993). This class of arguments, which
we term ‘stateness-first’ arguments, generally holds that some aspects of the state must de-
velop before the introduction of mass politics—including contested multi-party elections with
extensive franchise—if democracy is to succeed and produce benevolent outcomes. While
several scholars have rejected such notions of institutional sequencing, questioning the factual
basis of the proposed risks of ‘premature elections’ and ‘out-of-sequence’ changes (Berman,
2007; Carothers, 2007; Hobson, 2012), this argument remains widely popular among scholars
and in policy circles.
A recent and well-argued formulation of the stateness-first argument was proposed by
Fukuyama (2012; 2014a), who maintains that a strong state—defined by state capacity and
rule of law—is necessary to equip democracies for success.1 Echoing the argument by Shefter
(1993), Fukuyama (2014b) sums up the core logic of this benevolent sequence as follows:
“when a modern, Weberian state has coalesced prior to the expansion of the democratic
franchise, it tends to resist colonization by patronage-dispensing politicians because it devel-
ops around it a protective ‘absolutist coalition’” (p. 1333). Fukuyama invokes the concepts
of patronage—the reciprocal exchange of favors between two individuals of different status
and power—and clientelism—patronage on a larger scale—treating clientelism as a conse-
quence of unfettered democracy. This is based on the premise that only democratic politics
1State capacity, in turn, is a two-dimensional concept pertaining, respectively, to the scope
of state functions and the strength of state institutions. Holding a monopoly of power, and
having the strength to effectively enforce it, represent minimum requirements for any central
authority (Fukuyama, 2014a, p. 54–59). For rule of law to be fully achieved, laws should be
binding on even the most powerful political actors in society, without politicians being able
to change them whenever it suits them (Fukuyama, 2014a, p. 11, 24).
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requires the mobilization of large masses of voters (Fukuyama, 2014a, p. 86). If democracy
is introduced before bars against clientelism—such as merit-based recruitment to, and im-
partial and rule-following behavior by, the bureaucracy—are in place, democratic leaders
will offer government positions for political support. Thus, “[c]lientelism emerges in young
democracies precisely because the state and its resources constitute useful piggy banks for
democratic politicians seeking to mobilize supporters.” (Fukuyama, 2014a, p. 532).
Where democracy meshes with clientelism, the result is a deterioration of governance
outcomes and the pursuit of policies that may ultimately hamper economic development.
The confluence of democracy and clientelism has the effect of directing government activities
toward serving the private interests of a corrupt few, reducing the quality of governance
by further eroding the capacity of the state, and eventually turning clientelism and elite
entrenchment into self-reinforcing processes. The practice of providing rents through patron-
client relationships in exchange for political support is widely regarded as a highly inefficient
form of redistribution (e.g., Robinson and Verdier, 2013). Clientelism can negatively affect
economic development by reducing productivity growth via inefficient allocation of resources
and increased costs and uncertainty of entrepreneurial activities (e.g., North, 1990; Acemoglu,
2008). It can also diminish investment in physical capital, as investors become wary of
increased expected costs and investment risks that follow from corrupt government and
‘bad polices’ (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995). Moreover, proponents of the stateness-first
argument underscore that ‘democratizing backwards’ reduce the quality of public services
such as education and health care (e.g., D’Arcy and Nistotskaya, 2017). This, in turn, hurts
the accumulation of human capital, another key immediate determinant of growth (e.g.,
Mankiw et al., 1992). Hence, democracy-first sequences should negatively influence growth
through different channels.
In sum, countries with weak state institutions at the time of democratization are an-
ticipated to experience worse governance outcomes and poorer economic performance, and
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they are anticipated to be locked into such situations over an extended period of time. In
contrast, countries that followed a stateness-first sequence are more likely to be put on a
development path that eventually make them resemble ‘Denmark’, Fukuyama’s metaphor
for a democratic, secure, well-governed, and prosperous country. In such a country “all
three sets of political institutions [are] in perfect balance: a competent state, strong rule
of law, and democratic accountability” (Fukuyama, 2014a, p. 25). Getting to Denmark,
therefore, depends on a favorable historical pathway of institutional development whereby
strong state institutions—including a rule-following bureaucracy with meritocratic recruit-
ment practices—appear before democratization.
2.2 Assumptions and counterfactuals
Despite the plausibility of the stateness-first argument, the argument relies on a set of
strong assumptions. We critically discuss three of these assumptions as well as issues of
specifying the appropriate counterfactual conditions for evaluating the argument.
State building under democracy: One key assumption of the stateness-first argu-
ment is that state-building is relatively hard to do in democracies, especially when starting
out in a low-capacity setting. Yet, Mazzuca and Munck (2014) note that state-building and
processes of democratization have historically co-evolved in many instances, and that early
democratization may even ease (nation- and) state-building. One proposed reason is that
democratization provides the state with much needed legitimacy in the eyes of contend-
ing political elites and citizens. Furthermore, several scholars contend that democratically
elected leaders face stronger incentives to provide public goods and services (e.g., Lake and
Baum, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Providing public services to prospective voters
in an efficient manner may increase re-election chances, thus incentivizing democratic leaders
to build a competent bureaucratic apparatus for delivering such services. Public goods pro-
vision also requires taxation, which, in turn, requires well-functioning bureaucratic support
functions. This creates another, albeit indirect, incentive for democratic politicians to build
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state capacity. A handful of large-n studies have tested for a relationship between democ-
racy and state capacity, mostly reporting a positive association (Adzera et al., 2003; Ba¨ck
and Hadenius, 2008; Carbone and Memoli, 2015; Wang and Xu, 2018). While these findings
run counter to the assumption undergirding the stateness-first argument, we note that some
recent studies have added qualifications, suggesting that democracy may only enhance ca-
pacity in rich-country contexts (Charron and Lapuente, 2010) or that competitive elections
enhance capacity whereas suffrage expansions may have the opposite effect (Andersen and
Cornell, 2018).
State building under autocracy: A second, and related, assumption is that auto-
cratic leaders are both capable and willing to develop strong and capable state institutions.
The above-mentioned empirical findings call this notion into question. On the theoretical
side—and notwithstanding the question of whether autocratic regimes have the requisite
knowledge and capacity to engage in such institution building—one important question is:
how strong are the incentives of most autocrats to invest in state capacity? Indeed, many
theoretical contributions highlight that autocratic regimes often have strong incentives to
under -invest in building effective state institutions (e.g., Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010;
Charron and Lapuente, 2010). What is more, autocrats sometimes have direct incentives
to ‘build down’ the quality and capacity of state institutions to enhance personal control
over access to public resources (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Knutsen, 2013), as indicated by the
‘informalization’ of politics under African strongman-rule in the post-colonial period (see,
e.g., Chabal and Daloz, 1999). While there may be situations where autocrats (and demo-
cratic leaders) face stronger incentives to build state capacity—for instance in the presence
of an external threat (e.g., Tilly, 1990; Fukuyama, 2014a)—we surmise that most autocratic
regimes do not face strong incentives to do so.
Democratic transitions in consolidated autocracies: A third, and also often
implicit, assumption is that autocratic governments are willing to yield power and oversee
8
transitions to democracy—or at least, that they are more easily pressured into doing so—after
the initial building of state institutions. This is required for these stateness-first regimes to
eventually end up like ‘Denmark’. There is, however, little evidence that autocratic regimes
more easily yield power after they have built capable and effective state institutions. In
fact, there is evidence to the contrary. Andersen et al. (2014), for example, find that the
expansion of certain types of state capacity, notably fiscal capacity and a firm monopoly on
violence, significantly prolong the reign of autocratic regimes. Similarly, recent studies have
found evidence that state capacity moderates the effect of elections on autocratic regime
breakdown (Seeberg, 2015; van Ham and Seim, 2017). Autocratic regimes presiding over
a state that is able to effectively extract resources (that can be used for co-optation) and
repress threats are better able to bolster their own hold on power. This means that the final
step in the prescribed stateness-first sequence (democratization) may be hard to achieve.
Countries that build state capacity under autocracy may thus be stuck in a high-capacity–
autocracy equilibrium for a long time, without reaping the anticipated development benefits
following from a ‘mature’ democratic transition.
Specifying the counterfactual: The stateness-first argument is a causal argument—
building state capacity before democratization is proposed to cause, among other outcomes,
faster economic development. As all causal arguments, the validity of the stateness-first
argument hinges on the relevant comparison, and thus assumptions about the proper coun-
terfactual. An important question in this regard is: what is the relevant comparison to a
state that democratized after high-capacity state institutions came in place (see also Knut-
sen, 2013)? This question is often neglected, or receives only a vague answer, in existing
contributions, for understandable reasons. Explicitly specifying the appropriate counter-
factual in the stateness-first argument is trickier than one might suppose and, we surmise,
critically depends on how one interprets the broader theory.
First, if the theory is construed as the causal effect of democratization D (represented by
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a binary variable in which 1 =democratization), conditional on the pre-existing level of state
capacity, S (0 = low; 1 = high), on some outcome, Y , then the proper comparison would
be: Y = (Y(D=1|S=1) − Y(D=0|S=1)) − (Y(D=1|S=0) − Y(D=0|S=0)). This compares the effects of
democratization in high- vs. in low-capacity states. In this formulation, constructing the
counterfactual outcome for a democratizing state under high capacity is non-trivial, since it
involves comparing it to three counterfactual scenarios and not simply to democratization
under low capacity. Below, we conduct such types of comparisons by using panel regressions
(e.g., Figure 2 and Appendix A), but also by using matching techniques (e.g., Models 1 and
2, Table 2).
Alternatively, one might contend that some versions of the stateness-first argument fo-
cuses squarely on differences within the subset of observations that actually experience de-
mocratization; obtaining democracy under high state capacity should lead to stronger future
development than democratizing in low-capacity contexts. This is equivalent to stating that
Y(D=1|S=1) − (Y(D=1|S=0) > 0. While we highlight that this statement does not speak to the
causal effect of democratization—no contrasts are made against counter-factual outcomes
associated with remaining autocratic, under various realizations of S—this descriptive claim
certainly exists in various formulations of the stateness-first argument. We thus also run
tests aiming to evaluate this claim by only comparing observations that have undergone
democratic transitions (e.g., Models 3-5, Table 2).
Yet, if we interpret the theory to say that the sequence of institutional changes matters
(regardless of the effects of democracy on the development of a capable public administration,
or vice versa) then the proper comparison is between a country that historically democra-
tized after developing a capable public administration, and a country that democratized
before developing a capable public administration. Importantly, such comparisons zooms in
on the effect of the particular historical sequence of institutional adoptions and isolates it
from the effects of levels of state-capacity and democracy. This type of comparison amounts
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to saying that two otherwise equal countries, but with different institutional-sequencing his-
tories, will differ in outcomes due to these different historical sequences. Tests that assess
this specification of the theory are presented in Section 4.3.
A final complicating matter for evaluating the stateness-first argument relates to the
complex inter-relationship between democracy and state capacity. Our discussions above
suggested that state capacity is endogenous to regime type, but also that democratiza-
tion may be a function of state capacity. These points are appreciated by proponents of
the stateness-first argument, although the anticipated signs of the relationships between
democracy and state building are often different from what our discussions above suggested.
Nonetheless, if we anticipate that there are links between the two institutional factors, this
also has implications for considerations on counterfactuals and empirical design. If we as-
sume that subsequent regime developments and changes to state capacity are strongly linked
to whether or not the first historical transition to democracy took place in a high- or low-
capacity context—for example because ‘premature democratization’ leads to both political
instability and difficulties in building capable administrations—it makes sense to only com-
pare observations on the basis of their first democratic transition. Further, we should then
measure Y with a substantial time lag, and not control for subsequently realized values on
democracy and state capacity, since doing so will induce post-treatment bias (see, e.g., Model
4, Table 2). In contrast, if we believe that subsequent developments to regime type and state
capacity (after the first historical transition) are driven mostly by other factors, it makes
sense to control for these subsequent historical developments and even current realizations
of state capacity and democracy (see, e.g., Model 5, Table 2; Models 3–5, Table 3).
2.3 Extant evidence
The body of evidence for the stateness-first argument largely consists of historical country
narratives. Both early (e.g., Huntington, 1968) and recent contributions (e.g., Fukuyama,
2014a) draw heavily on case histories that comport with the prescribed sequence of building
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state institutions before introducing mass politics, often from the historical experiences of
Western countries. Møller (2015) questions the accuracy of the common narrative surround-
ing the sequencing of institutions in Western countries, however, arguing that “[t]he notion,
so often taken for granted, that it went ‘state-first, democracy later,’ rests on an oversimpli-
fication of European history. What that history shows is that instances of either ‘state-first’
or ‘democracy-first’ sequencing were rare. What was much more common was for budding
state institutions, the rule of law, and political accountability to grow alongside one another
while interacting in messy ways. If there is any sequential pattern, it is for state-building
to appear very late in the game.” (p.111). Responding to this criticism, Fukuyama (2014b)
argues that it employs a too inclusive definition of democracy, and that the historical leg-
islative assemblies and rights highlighted by Møller (2015) represent rule-of-law institutions
rather than democracy.
Still, this points to a broader problem with the extant (largely case-based) evidence
used to support the stateness-first argument: When stringent operationalizations of the
relevant institutional features are lacking, it is, in practice, difficult to reliably describe the
actual sequence of institutional development postulated in the theory. This, in turn, makes
it problematic to assess whether a case narrative—no matter how thoroughly laid out—
actually corroborates the theory or not. The historical-narrative type of evidence also makes
it hard to control for factors that contribute to the endogenous evolution of state-capacity
and democracy. The problem of clearly identifying proper counterfactuals, discussed above,
also raises issue for the interpretation of case narratives. To evaluate hypotheses on the
detrimental consequences of the ‘premature’ introduction of democracy, the appropriate
contrast class for the clientelistic, young democracy with low state capacity and weak rule
of law not only includes countries that democratized under strong state capacity and well-
functioning rule of law, but also the patronage-ridden autocracy with low state capacity and
an equally weak rule of law. Such complex comparisons have typically not been made in the
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case-based literature, at least not in an explicit and systematic manner.
What is more, given that explicit rules for selecting observations are missing, the case-
based evidence is open to the charge of selective choice and interpretation of cases. These
issues are compounded by the lack of clear criteria for how to select among different time
periods, patterns, and events to exemplify a country’s development. Concerning the se-
lection of countries, how would, for example, the inclusion of narratives from Botswana
or Mauritius—recent development miracles happening under democratic rule, in countries
where democratization occurred under (initially) low levels of state capacity—alter the eval-
uation of the theory? (For numerous country cases, from different regions, that seem to
contrast with the stateness-first argument, see Mazzuca and Munck, 2014). To exemplify
other selection issues, the (relatively authoritarian) Prussian regime is (correctly) lauded by
several scholars for its ability to modernize the military and state. These experiences have
also been invoked as evidence for the stateness-first argument (see, e.g., Fukuyama, 2014a).
However, a reading of somewhat more recent German history would highlight how autocratic
forces contributed to the country entering into two world wars, with devastating effects on
the infrastructure, economy and human development. This speaks to issues of unclear se-
lection of outcome variables as well as potential selection biases related to the time period
under study—whether or not Prussia/Germany is an unambiguous success story arguably
depends on whether we end our investigations in 1885, 1920, 1945, or 1970.
Accompanying the wealth of case-narratives, a few large-n studies have aimed to evalu-
ate stateness-first arguments. One recent example is D’Arcy and Nistotskaya (2017). These
authors provide a novel justification based on rational choice theory for the hypothesis that
sequencing state capacity before democratization enhances governance and provision of pub-
lic goods. The authors draw on an impressive data collection effort on state-administered
cadasters—“systematically arranged inventories of individual land parcels and land owner-
ship” (p.2)—for 78 countries back to the year 1 A.D. They use these data to construct an
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indicator of states’ monitoring capacity. In a series of cross-section regressions, D’Arcy and
Nistotskaya (2017) show that countries that scored high on this index at the time of democ-
ratization currently outperform countries that scored low on the index at democratization,
on different public goods and development outcomes (quality of public services, education
expenditures, infant mortality rates). However, D’Arcy and Nistotskaya (2017) do not in-
clude countries that remain autocratic, and consequently do not compare the performance
of democratizers versus non-democratizers either in contexts of low or high state capacity.
As our discussion on counter-factuals above suggests, this generates issues for evaluating any
causal effect implied by the stateness-first argument. The analysis does show that countries
such as Denmark or Sweden, which had high state capacity at democratization, are asso-
ciated with better outcomes than countries with low capacity at democratization such as
Benin or Mongolia.2 But, this finding could stem from other factors, such as state capacity
being persistent and affecting development (regardless of the timing of democratization).3
Hence, these analyses do not provide direct evidence for the stateness-first argument.
Two studies speak somewhat more directly to the stateness-first argument, investigating
whether the effects of democracy are conditional on level of state capacity, with economic
growth (Knutsen, 2013) and health-care and education outcomes (Hanson, 2015) as depen-
dent variables. Both studies suggest that democracy actually has a significantly stronger
positive effect on the different outcomes in contexts of low state capacity, which contrasts
with a core assumption of the stateness-first argument—that democracy has more benevolent
effects in high-capacity contexts. Still, these studies rely on fairly limited time series or time-
invariant measures of state capacity, and do not explicitly assess the historical sequences of
democratization and state-building.
2The usual caveats related to drawing causal inferences from cross-sectional regressions
apply, notably related to unobserved geographic, cultural or political-historical confounders.
3Indeed, D’Arcy and Nistotskaya (2017) show that their cadaster index measured at the
time of democratization is a significant predictor of current levels of state capacity.
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Below, we employ new data with longer time series that comprise most of what histo-
rians regard as ‘modern history’, including the late 18th and 19th centuries. This is the
time period from which most case-based evidence supporting the ‘stateness-first’ argument
is drawn. We examine the argument not only by re-assessing the above-mentioned core as-
sumption tested in Knutsen (2013) and Hanson (2015) on longer time series, but also by
testing various empirical implications that follow from the argument, notably including tests
directly assessing the relevance of the temporal sequence in which different institutions were
introduced historically.
3 Measuring institutions
Theories about institutional sequencing are difficult to test systematically. The hypothe-
ses derived from such theories pertain to developments over long periods of time and involve
different institutions that need to be clearly distinguished. Thus, in addition to covering
many countries, data should a) have sufficiently long time series to capture pertinent histor-
ical changes and b) include detailed and distinct indicators on the relevant institutional fea-
tures. Some datasets, such as Polity (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007), offer long time series but
only include measures of democracy-relevant aspects and do not sufficiently distinguish be-
tween different democratic-institutional features (see, e.g., Coppedge et al., 2011). Datasets
measuring state-capacity features have either been purely cross-sectional (e.g., Evans and
Rauch, 1999) or based on short time series (e.g., Kaufmann et al., 2010).
The data situation has changed with the recent Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset
(Coppedge et al., 2017). V-Dem includes more than 400 detailed measures, not only related
to narrow conceptualizations of democracy (e.g., contested multi-party elections) but also
features of rule of law and state capacity. Some measures are more objective and are coded
by research assistants, whereas others are more evaluative and require expert judgments.
Several strategies are pursued to limit measurement error and ensure cross-expert-, inter-
15
temporal-, and cross-country comparability.4 V-Dem covers about 180 countries from 1900
to the present. Notably, the more recent ‘Historical V-Dem’ data extends the time series
for many V-Dem indicators and indices back to the late 18th or early 19th century for 91
countries, thus covering a key period of state-building (Knutsen et al., 2017).
Our primary measure of democracy is V-Dem’s Polyarchy index (Teorell et al., 2016).
Stateness-first arguments focus on the introduction of mass politics through basic electoral
features of democracy such as multi-party elections and extensive suffrage, which Polyarchy
is well-suited to capture. It contains five sub-components on whether or not the chief execu-
tive is elected, how free and fair these elections are, and the extent to which there is freedom
of association, freedom of speech, and universal suffrage. The inclusion of freedoms of as-
sociation and speech reflect the importance of the free formation of opposition parties and
open discussion for multi-party elections to be truly competitive (see Dahl, 1971). Polyarchy
ranges from 0 to 1, but the empirical minimum and maximum values (for 22,406 country-
year observations) are 0.01 and 0.95, respectively. The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates that
most country-year observations cluster on the lower end of the scale, with differences in the
middle- and higher ends of the scale reflecting variation between ‘minimum-level electoral
democracies’ and ‘high-quality democracies’. Given the focus of the ‘stateness-first’ argu-
ment, which considers the consequences of introducing core democratic features, we should
use relatively low cut-off values in specifications that dichotomize Polyarchy. We therefore
often divide Polyarchy by its median (0.18 in full sample), which also produces evenly split
sub-samples and ensures higher-powered tests.
In robustness tests, we dichotomize Polyarchy by dividing at the mean (0.28). Switch-
4V-Dem uses a Bayesian Item-Response measurement model that leverages different kinds
of information (e.g., cross country coding and anchoring vignettes) to generate comparable,
interval-level scores from the ordinal indicators coded by multiple experts (Pemstein et al.,
2017).
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ing from a median- to mean-based dichotomization moves countries such as the United
States in 1800 and United Kingdom in 1835 (after the Reform Act) from the high- to the
low-democracy category. We also try out different cut-off points, and, where possible, run
models with Polyarchy as a continuous variable. Further, we test the binary electoral democ-
racy measure from Boix et al. (2012) (BMR), which registers the presence of ‘free and fair’
elections and requires that 1/4 of citizens are enfranchised. Finally, given the emphasis put
on suffrage in stateness-first arguments, we also test V-Dem’s v2x suffr indicator, measuring
the share of the adult population that is enfranchised.
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Figure 1 – Distribution of Polyarchy and impartial and rule-following administration
(v2clrspct), 1789–2016. Dotted line represents the median; solid line indicates the mean.
State capacity is variously defined in the literature, but key to many conceptualizations
is the ability of the public administration to effectively implement policies. This, in turn,
relates to several ‘Weberian’ features of the bureaucracy, including recruitment processes for
government officials (based on merit, as opposed to personal connections) and how officials
are compensated (decent wages, which supposedly mitigate corruption) (e.g., Evans and
Rauch, 1999). Other key features of Weberian bureaucracy is that decisions are based on
impersonal rules rather than personal discretion and that they are implemented impartially.
These features also tie into the concept of rule of law, which is explicitly considered a key
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“pre-requisite” for democratization by many scholars proposing stateness-first arguments,
including Fukuyama (2014a). While we test alternative proxies for state capacity from
V-Dem such as meritocratic recruitment to the state administration (v3stcritrecadm) and
extent of corruption (v2x corr), we thus rely principally on v2clrscpt. This V-Dem indicator
measures the extent to which public officials are impartial and rule-following in carrying out
their duties. Expert coders originally score this item on a five-point ordinal scale, which is
subsequently transformed to a continuous scale by the V-Dem measurement model (Pemstein
et al., 2017). The impartial and rule-following bureaucracy measure covers 24,005 country-
year observations across 1789–2016. It ranges from -3.55 to 4.67, and is close to normally
distributed with a median of -0.09 and mean of 0.06 (Figure 1; right panel).
Our dependent variables draw on the extensive Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP
p.c.) data from Fariss et al. (2017). To mitigate measurement error, which is present in all
extant measures of GDP (see Jerven, 2013), Farris et al. employ a dynamic latent trait
model to produce less error-prone estimates from several GDP (and population) sources.
Specifically, we use the estimates benchmarked in the Maddison time series, which has the
most extensive coverage among all GDP sources. In addition to mitigating different types of
measurement error, the imputation of missing values by the Farris et al. routine helps reduce
biases resulting from sample selection (Honaker and King, 2010). We employ (forward-
lagged) Ln GDP p.c. (controlling for initial Ln GDP p.c.) and GDP p.c. growth, across
different time intervals, as our dependent variables. For presentational reasons we introduce
the control variables in the next section.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Panel regressions
Our first tests are carried out with standard panel regressions. These tests probe whether
democracy is more beneficial for subsequent economic development when there is high versus
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low state capacity. By gauging whether the impact of democracy differs in low- and high-
capacity states, these models assess a key premise on which the ‘stateness-first’ argument
rests. We also test a key implication of the argument by assessing whether the level of state
capacity before or at the time of democratization relates to subsequent development.
We probed numerous panel specifications. The tests in Table 1 use Ln GDP p.c. as the
dependent variable, whereas Appendix A reports similar specifications using annualized GDP
p.c. growth. We start by running an OLS specification with country-year as unit of analysis
and errors clustered by country to account for autocorrelation. We control only for lagged
Ln GDP p.c. alongside country- and year-fixed effects. The year-fixed effects help account
for time trends and shorter-term global shocks to economic development and institutional
features that are common to all units. The country-fixed effects address country-specific
and time-invariant factors related to geography, culture, etc., that may simultaneously affect
institutional- and economic development The ability to control for such hard-to-observe
confounders is a distinct advantage of the panel models, both relative to existing studies
drawing on one or more historical country narratives, as well as large-n studies (including
the models included in the next sections) that draw on cross-country comparisons.
We intentionally keep our benchmark sparse in order to mitigate post-treatment biases.
Since democracy and state capacity may very well influence variables such as civil war or
natural resource dependence, controlling for them eliminates (relevant) indirect effects. Yet,
we do include these and other controls in subsequent tests that prioritize mitigating omitted
variable bias over mitigating post-treatment bias. We begin by measuring the outcome 20
years after the covariates, in order to gauge the medium-term effects of democracy in contexts
of high and low state capacity.
We first run our benchmark on sub-samples of low-capacity (Model 1) and high-capacity
(Model 2) states, respectively. To produce balanced sub-samples, we split by the median
sample value on v2clrscpt (-0.090). Polyarchy has a negative coefficient in the low-capacity
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Table 1 – Panel regressions with Ln GDP per capita as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample LC HC Full Full Full Full Full Full
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM GMM
Panel length 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr 1 yr 10 yrs 10 yrs
Dep var measured in year t+ 20 t+ 20 t+ 20 t+ 20 t+ 20 t+ 40 t+ 20 t+ 10
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Polyarchy -0.147 0.144 -0.101 -0.169 -0.101 0.029 0.181
(0.175) (0.119) (0.119) (0.115) (0.198) (0.331) (0.167)
Polyarchy X Impartial adm 0.072 0.045 0.096 -0.103 -0.126**
(0.046) (0.037) (0.090) (0.100) (0.050)
BMR democracy 0.009
(0.040)
BMR X Impartial adm 0.011
(0.024)
Impartial public admin 0.006 0.001 0.021 -0.007 0.078** 0.081***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.035) (0.036) (0.027)
Civil war 0.011
(0.038)
Resource dependence -0.007***
(0.003)
Ln Population -0.010
(0.048)
Ln GDP pc (lagged DV) 0.846*** 0.611*** 0.776*** 0.809*** 0.776*** 0.663*** 1.078*** 0.999***
(0.051) (0.068) (0.049) (0.045) (0.046) (0.076) (0.093) (0.042)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year/period dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 7318 7307 14643 11816 10073 11426 1530 1708
Countries 127 145 177 176 157 156 171 179
Maximum years/periods 202 206 206 195 179 186 21 22
R2 0.727 0.882 0.829 0.853 0.844 0.761
Number of instruments 169 178
Hansen J-test p-value .359 .978
AR(2) test p-value .011 .968
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Constant, country- and year dummies omitted. Errors clustered
by country in OLS and robust in (System) GMM. LC: Low capacity. HC: High capacity, determined relative to
median-sample value on IPA (-0.090) for full sample for specification corresponding to Models 1 and 2.
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sample and a positive in the high-capacity sample. Yet, none of the coefficients are close
to conventional levels of statistical significance. Model 3 is our benchmark run on the full
sample, but including Polyarchy, v2clrscpt and a multiplicative interaction term. While the
estimated relationship between democracy and growth increases in level of state capacity, the
pattern of interactions is not systematic. The same holds true in Model 4, which substitutes
Polyarchy with the dichotomous democracy measure (BMR) from Boix et al. (2012), and in
Model 5, which controls for population (Fariss et al., 2017), natural resources income/GDP
(Miller, 2015), and civil war (Haber and Menaldo, 2011).
More generally, the (null) result holds across sets of plausible controls and for alternate
measures of state capacity and democracy. The result is also robust when focusing more
specifically on suffrage rather than broader democracy measures, using annualized GDP p.c.
growth instead of Ln GDP p.c., and when changing the time frame across which we measure
the dependent variable (both shorter and longer time frames; see Appendix A). Model 6
illustrates the latter, as it measures Ln GDP p.c. 40 years after the covariates. So far, there
is no clear support for the core assumption of the stateness-first argument that democracy
is more conducive to development in high-capacity than in low-capacity contexts.
Next, we employ the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, which
is appropriate for dealing with ‘sluggish’ variables such as democracy and state capacity
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). This estimator allows us to account for the potential endogeneity
of our institutional variables (and interaction term), by using lagged levels (changes) as
instruments for current changes (levels) in institutions (Roodman, 2009). Hence, when model
assumptions are met, GMM estimates should not reflect any reverse effect from economic
development on democracy and/or state capacity. GMM models are, however, originally
constructed to handle relatively short time series, and long time series typically increase
the number of instruments beyond advisable levels (the rule of thumb is fewer instruments
than cross-section units, see Roodman, 2009). Thus, we follow the conventional practice of
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growth economists and reduce our dataset to a ten-year panel structure.5 In Model 7, which
measures Ln GDP p.c. 20 years after the covariates, we find a negative, but insignificant,
interaction term. However, the AR(2) test suggests that autocorrelation is an issue, and
results are thus not credible. When measuring Ln GDP per capita only ten years after
the covariates in Model 8, however, the negative interaction between democracy and state
capacity turns statistically significant at 5%. The AR(2)- and Hansen J-tests suggest that
this model gives consistent estimates. Hence, Model 8 indicates that democracy actually
has a more benevolent (medium-term) effect on growth in low-capacity states. This result
is in line with the findings in Knutsen (2013), which are based on data from more recent
decades. Overall, however, our panel regressions do not reveal a robust interaction between
state capacity and democracy on growth.
Another test of the stateness-first argument is to compare changes in growth before and
after all recorded democratization episodes, and check whether post-transition increases in
growth are more likely for democratization episodes in high-capacity states. Appendix A dis-
cusses such panel regressions, for instance using the measure by Boix et al. (2012) to identify
democratic transition episodes. We do not find any evidence corroborating the stateness-
first argument from these tests either. This is illustrated by Figure 2, which contains four
scatter plots that map the difference in pre- and post-transition growth (both measured over
twenty-year periods) along the y-axes and 10-year pre-transition averages on four proxies
of state capacity along the x-axes. These measures include our main measure on impar-
tial and rule-following administration, but also V-Dem measures on corruption, clientelism,
and meritocratic recruitment to the bureaucracy. There is substantial variation in post-
transition growth changes, both among low- and high-capacity states, and the best-fit lines
5Since we have three endogenous institutional variables and very long time series, we must
also restrict the lags used for instrumentation (second and third lag) to keep the instrument-
count down.
22
Sweden1911
Japan1952
Colombia1937
Colombia1958Br zil1946
Portugal1911
Portugal1976
El Salvador1984
Bolivia1979
Bolivia1982
H nduras 5Honduras1971
Honduras1982
Peru1956
Peru1963
Peru1980Argentina1912
Argentina1958Argentina1963
Argentina1973
Argentina1983
Leba n197
Thailand1975
Thaila d1983
Venezuela1959Nicaragua1984
Chile1909
Chile1934
Costa Rica1949
Ecuador1948
Ecuador1979
France1848France1870
France1946
Germany1919
Gu temala1945
Guatemala1958
Guatemala1966
Italy1919
Italy1946
Netherlands1897
P nama1950
Panama1952
Spain1931
Spain 77
Turkey1961Turkey1983 United Kingdom1885
Uruguay1919
Uruguay1942
Dominic n Republic1966Austria1920
Cuba1940
Denmark1901
Gr ece18 4
Greece1926
Greece1944
Greece1974-5
0
5
10
-4 -2 0 2 4
meanl10_pubadm
Sweden1911
Japan1952
Colombia1937
Colombia1958Br zil1946
Portugal1911
Portugal1976
El Salvador1984
Bolivia1979
Bolivia1982
Honduras1957r 71
Honduras1982
Peru1956
Peru1963
Peru1980Argentina1912
Argentina1958Argentina1963
Argentina1973
Argentina1983
Lebanon1971
Thailand1975
Thailand1983
Venezuela1959Nicaragua1984
Chile1909
Chile1934
Costa Rica194
Ecuador1948
Ecuador1979
France1848France1870
France1946
Germany1919
Guatemala1945
Guatemala1958
Guatemala1966
Italy1919
Italy1946
Neth rlands1897
Panama1950
Panama1952
Spain1931
Spain1977
Turkey1961Turkey1983United Kingdom1885
Uruguay1919
Uruguay1942
D minic n Republic1966Austria1920
Cuba1940
Denmark1901
Gre ce1864
Greece1926
Greece1944
Greece1974-5
0
5
10
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
meanl10_corrupt
Sweden1911
Japan1952
Colombia1937
Colombia1958Brazil1946
Portugal1911
Portugal1976
El Salvador1984
Bolivia1979
Bolivia1982
Honduras1957Honduras1971
Honduras1982
Peru1956
Peru1963
Peru1980Argentina1912
Argentina1958Argentina1963Lebanon 9 1
Thailand1975
Thailand1983
Venezuela1959Nicaragu 1984
Chile1909
Chile1934
Costa Rica1949
Ecuador1948
Ecuador1979
Fr nce1848France1870
France1946
Germany1919
Guatemala 945
Guatemala1958
Guatemala1966
Italy1919
Italy1946
Netherlands1897
Panama1950
Panama1952
Spain1931
Spain1977
Turkey1961Turkey1983Unit d Kingdom 85
Uruguay1 19
Uruguay1942
Domi ic n Republic1966Austri 20
Cuba1940
Denmark1901
Greec 1864
Greece1926
Greece1944
Greece1974-5
0
5
10
-4 -2 0 2 4
meanl10_client
Sweden1911
Portugal1911
Argentina1912
France1848France1870
Germany1919
Italy1919
Netherlands1897
United Kingdom1885
Uruguay1919
Austria1920 Denmark1901
Greece1864
-5
0
5
10
-1 0 1 2 3
meanl10_meritocratic
Figure 2 – Proxies of state capacity and change in growth rate from before to after transition.
Notes: Average 20-years post-transition GDP p.c. growth minus average 20-years pre-transition
GDP p.c. growth along the y-axis, and 10-year average pre-transition scores on rule-following
bureaucracy (upper-left), corruption (upper-right), clientelism (lower-left), and meritocratic
recruitment (lower-right; data from 1789–1920) along x-axes. The scatterplots are overlaid
with best-fit lines and 95 percent confidence intervals.
and confidence intervals reveal no systematic patterns. This conflicts with the stateness-first
argument, which predicts a greater growth-benefit from democratization in high-capacity
contexts.
4.2 Matching analysis
Still, as discussed, it is not clear what is the most appropriate counterfactual comparison
when probing the stateness-first argument. The choice of contrast class depends on specific
assumptions related, e.g., to how democracy influences state building. To tackle this issue,
we present tests making different relevant comparisons under alternative assumptions about
appropriate counterfactuals, using Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) models (see Iacus
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et al., 2012). These models allow us to draw inferences from (only) comparing otherwise
similar units (in their propensity to receive treatment) that differ on the treatment variable,
and we assess both medium- and longer-term development effects of democratization in
different state-institutional contexts.
All models include the following matching variables: year of democratization, GDP per
capita at democratization, and—since we cannot account for country-fixed effects in this set-
up—geographic region and score on the Ethnic Fractionalization Index from Alesina et al.
(2003). CEM demands that all variables are categorized for the matching, and observations
are only compared with observations placed in the exact same categories. Hence, there is
a trade-off between only comparing very similar observations (fine-grained categories) and
having many observations with available matches (broader categories). In some models
we group year into three categories, with cut-offs chosen to reflect the various ‘Waves of
Democratization’ (Huntington, 1991). In other specifications, we compare on the exact
year of democratization. Ln GDP per capita is always recoded into three categories (<1st
quartile; 1st–3rd quartiles; >3rd quartile). Ethnic fractionalization and the rule-following
and impartial bureaucracy measure (v2clsrcpt) are recast into binary variables, with median
values as thresholds. We always run (OLS) regressions after the matching to account for
differences on the covariates within the categories, and then use the (logged) numeric version
of these variables as covariates.6 Our benchmark operationalizes ‘democratization’ as going
from below- to above-median score on Polyarchy.
We start out with matching-designs that resemble the logic of the panel specifications.
We compare countries that experienced democratization with autocratic countries—i.e., the
treatment that we match on is democratization—but only allow for comparisons within
6CEM groups similar observations into different subclasses, and weights the observations
based on the ratio of treatment-/control observations. We use these weights in all regressions,
which also include subclass fixed effects.
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groups of otherwise similar countries, following the rules outlined above and matching on
the democratization year. Thus, we only compare countries with below-median scores on the
rule-following and impartial public administration measure with each other, and similarly for
above-median countries. In subsequent regressions, we estimate whether score on the impar-
tial and rule-following administration measure at the time of democratization systematically
predicts differences in logged income level 20 years later.7 Initially, we allow countries to
enter with more than one democratization episode, but to avoid mixing effects from multiple
episodes we only include democratization episodes if the country had 20 years of consecutive
autocratic rule prior to democratization. Results are reported in Model 1, Table 2. The
coefficient on impartial and rule-following administration is very small (0.06) and far from
statistically significant (t = 0.7). Hence, we do not find that a rule-following and impartial
bureaucracy at the time of democratization enhances subsequent economic development.
Since our democratization measure is constructed by setting a cut-off on a continuous
scale, one worry is that some countries could tip just above the median-value on Polyarchy
one year, and then revert the next year. Such small changes could even result from measure-
ment uncertainty (Pemstein et al., 2017). Therefore, we re-estimated Model 1 by restricting
the definition of democratization to situations when a country passed the median-threshold
and stayed above it for 10 consecutive years. The downside of using this ‘10-year rule’ is that
it introduces a form of post-treatment bias, since democracies with higher growth rates are
more likely to avoid democratic regressions (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Kennedy, 2010),
and because political instability and democratic regressions can be viewed as one proposed
mechanism through which transitions under low state capacity could mitigate growth, per
7A downside to using such a long time lag is that estimated effects may be attenuated if
the autocracies compared with democracies go through democratization experiences in the
time interval between our independent and dependent variables are measured. We deal with
this issue in alternative specifications below.
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the stateness-first argument. However, the insignificant impartial and rule-following admin-
istration coefficient barely changes when employing the 10-year rule (Model 1, Appendix
Table B.1). Results are also fairly stable (with and without the 10-year rule) to using transi-
tions from 0 to 1 on the BMR measure of electoral democracy or a dummy registering when
countries pass a threshold of 50 percent of the adult population being enfranchised, although
we note that one specification using majority suffrage as indicator of democratization lends
support to the stateness-first argument (see Appendix B).
Yet, 20 years might be insufficient for capturing longer-term differences in development
coming from experiencing democratization at different levels of state capacity. The outcome
variable in Model 2 is Ln GDP p.c. measured in 2004, the year with the best data coverage
after 2000. We now only use the first democratization episode recorded in a country’s history.
This is consistent with the notion that political instability and democratic deterioration are
partly consequences of the first democratic transition happening under conditions of weak
state capacity. Thus, even if subsequent transitions carry an effect on economic develop-
ment, these effects may be viewed as ‘indirect effects’, and should thus not be controlled for.
We match countries that experience their first democratization with an autocratic country
observed in the exact same year, and otherwise follow the matching procedure as outlined
above. Model 2 shows no evidence that impartial and rule-following bureaucracy at democ-
ratization is related to contemporary economic performance. The relationship is both weak
(0.11) and statistically insignificant.
Proceeding with a different set of comparisons, the last three models in Table 2 only com-
pare countries that undergo democratization experiences, but which do so under contexts of
relatively high and low state capacity. In other words, the treatment that we match on is the
dichotomized measure on impartial and rule-following bureaucracy. We follow the template
from above and match these democratization observations on time period of democratiza-
tion, income level at democratization, geographic region, and ethnic fractionalization, and
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run OLS regressions post-matching. Model 3 measures the outcome 20 years after democra-
tization. Model 4 measures the outcome in 2004, thus evaluating whether historically having
transitioned under weak or strong state capacity relates to ‘current’ income. Once again,
we find no support for the hypothesis that transition under state institutions with relatively
high capacity corresponds with subsequent economic development, be it in the medium or
long term.
Finally, in Model 5, we compare countries that are about equally democratic and have
about equally capable bureaucracies today, but which have different institutional-sequencing
histories. First, we subset the data to countries that were relatively democratic and had
relatively capable states in 2004, and match on region, ethnic fractionalization, time period
of democratization, and income at democratization. We then compare 2004 Ln GDP per
capita scores across countries that had relatively high and low scores on the bureaucracy
measure at their first incidence of democratization. Do these otherwise similar countries
differ in income today, based on their different democratization histories? The results from
Model 5 suggests that they do not. The results are robust to making various changes to the
matching specification, including when we employ Entropy Balancing (Hainmueller, 2012)
instead of Coarsened Exact Matching (see Appendix B).
4.3 Comparing sequences
Our final approach involves comparing observations on the different institutional se-
quences that they experienced historically and assessing potential consequences for economic
growth. The long time span of our data enables us to differentiate country-histories based on
whether high levels of state capacity preceded high levels of democracy or not. The particular
mechanisms that explain changes in the relative levels of state strength and democracy may
differ across countries and time—and indeed, they may be endogenously related to historical
levels of economic development, which we control for. But, the fundamental implication
that we want to assess is whether such stateness-first patterns, in general, are a boon for
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later economic development. Compared to the panel-tests and the pre-parametric match-
ing analysis, this approach has the benefit of leveraging the entire institutional history of
a country and correlating it with growth, enabling what are arguably more direct—even if
descriptive—assessments of the stateness-first sequencing argument.
We start by conceptualizing fairly simple patterns of development, dividing the roughly
22,000 country-years with coverage on both V-Dem measures into four states based on
whether each observation fell above/below median scores for Polyarchy (0.178) and v2clsrcpt
(-0.080) in each year. The sub-samples constitute, respectively, 34 (low democracy–low state
capacity), 17 (high democracy–low capacity), 16 (low democracy–high capacity), and 33
(high democracy–high capacity) percent of observations. When calculating transition prob-
abilities between states (see Figure 3) we find that countries with low levels on both state
capacity and democracy fairly often transition to high democracy–low capacity and that
transitions from low to high state capacity among non-democracies are relatively infrequent.
This pattern follows our earlier criticism of the assumption underlying the stateness-first
argument, concerning prospects of state building in autocracies. Still, the observation that
high democracy–low capacity situations often transition into low capacity–low democracy sit-
uations is more in line with the stateness-first argument. Weak-capacity democracies fairly
often go through ‘de-democratization’ processes. Yet, we note that this observation is also
consistent with various other theories of political development, including theories proposing
that low income (which correlates with low state capacity) destabilizes democracies (e.g.,
Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
To test the relationship between institutional sequencing histories and growth, we specify
OLS models with Ln GDP p.c. measured in t + 20 as dependent variable, and include
current Ln GDP p.c as regressor. We add a dummy variable capturing the stateness-first
pattern, identifying those countries that had previously transitioned from low democracy–
high capacity to high levels of both. The indicator does not require that transitions between
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Figure 4 – Sequence index plot distinguishing ‘stateness-first’ sequences.
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states are consecutive, but merely that high capacity and low democracy co-existed prior
to attaining high capacity–high democracy status. To isolate the effect of the sequencing of
institutional changes from the levels of state capacity and democracy at each point in time,
as well as from the duration of time over which the institutional states have been in place,
we use different control strategies.
Figure 4 illustrates the institutional sequencing histories—each country is represented by
a horizontal line—for ‘stateness-first’ countries (left) and all other countries (right). There
are 56 countries categorized as ‘stateness-first’ countries that include countries with (gen-
erally) high-growth track records, such as Japan and Taiwan, but also countries with more
mixed development records, such as Turkey and Venezuela. OLS results comparing them to
countries that did not follow a ‘stateness-first’ pattern are reported in Table 3
In Model 1, Table 3, we include three dummies representing the different ‘institutional
states’ (low democracy–low capacity is reference category) alongside the dummy capturing
whether a country experienced a stateness-first sequence. According to this model, having
experienced a transition from high state capacity and low democracy to high levels of both
is negatively associated with subsequent economic development, everything else equal. The
negative stateness-first dummy is significant at 1%.
However, the time spent in each institutional state may also have lingering effects on
growth patterns (see Gerring et al., 2005). In order to account not only for the current
institutional make-up, but also for the cumulative institutional experience of a country,
Model 2 includes a count of the number of years that a country had previously observed
in each state. This model also controls for Ln GDP p.c. at the time of transition. The
stateness-first coefficient remains negative and is considerably larger in size than in Model 1.
Model 3 is a more constrained version of Model 2 that accounts for civil war, natural resource
dependence, and population size. The sample is reduced to roughly 10000 observations due
to missingness on these covariates, and among the added controls only natural resources
31
Table 3 – Stateness-first sequences and economic development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Stateness-first -0.185*** -0.625*** -0.708***
(0.066) (0.104) (0.134)
Stateness-first, -0.547***
(20 years) (0.144)
Stateness-first, -0.502***
(20 consecutive years) (0.171)
Low dem., high cap. 0.051 0.064* -0.030 -0.030 -0.030
(0.039) (0.038) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
High dem., low cap. -0.024 -0.018 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046
(0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
High dem., high cap. 0.022 0.036 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.048) (0.046) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Σlow dem., low cap. -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Σlow dem., high cap. -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Σhigh dem., low cap. -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Σhigh dem., high cap. 0.001* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln GDP p.c. at transition 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.014 -0.001
(0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012)
Polyarchy -0.139 -0.137 -0.136
(0.117) (0.116) (0.116)
Impartial administration 0.037 0.037 0.037
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Polyarchy x Impartial adm. -0.018 -0.020 -0.019
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Civil War 0.012 0.013 0.013
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Resource dependence -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln population 0.007 0.006 0.005
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.803*** 0.771*** 0.767*** 0.766*** 0.768***
(0.041) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
N 14643 14643 10073 10073 10073
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. OLS regressions with
Ln GDP p.c. in t+20 as dependent variable. Constant and year dummies omitted.
Country-year is unit. Errors are clustered by country.
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exhibits a significant (negative) relationship with future income. The model also controls for
current levels of Polyarchy and impartial public administration, as well as their interaction
term. The negative stateness-first result is further strengthened in this specification.
Models 4 and 5 adjust on Model 3 by employing more conservative coding criteria for the
stateness-first dummy. In Model 4, we require that a country experienced at least twenty
years of high state capacity and low democracy before democratization to be registered as
‘stateness-first’, and in Model 5 we require that a country spent at least twenty consecutive
years as a high-capacity autocracy before democratization. Consistent with prior tests,
these more conservative stateness-first dummies are negative, thus providing evidence in
discord with the stateness-first argument. We note that the specifications in Table 3 suggest
that having spent numerous years as a high-capacity democracy is conducive to economic
development. But, arriving at this institutional combination through first experiencing the
building of state capacity and then democratization is not a positive factor.
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Figure 5 – Estimates for ‘stateness-first’ transitions, for varying leads.
(based on Model 3, Table 3 )
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We subjected the models in Table 3 to several other robustness tests. First, as Figure 5
suggests, the negative correlation persists for different forward leads. Following the specifi-
cation in Model 3 of Table 3, the coefficients (surrounded by 90-percent confidence intervals)
are estimated when varying the measurement of the dependent variable between t + 2 and
t+20. At higher leads—estimating GDP per capita further into the future—the uncertainty
around the stateness-first estimate increases but the negative coefficient increases in size. Sec-
ond, we restricted the comparison to include only the 90 countries that transitioned to high
capacity–high democracy from either high capacity–low democracy or low capacity–high
democracy. When doing so, the estimate is attenuated but remains statistically significant
at the 1% level.
Patterns of institutional change may vary based on differences stemming from geographic
factors and colonial histories (Acemoglu et al., 2008), and such differences may also influ-
ence growth (although they might do so via affecting institutions; see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2001).
Nevertheless, the clear negative relationship remains when controlling for region of the world
and the year of independence. The relationship is somewhat sensitive to employing alter-
native operationalizations of democratization and the chosen threshold for achieving ‘high’
state capacity (See Appendix Table C.1). We replicated our design, but dividing by mean
values for Polyarchy (0.271) and v2clrscpt (0.037) rather than the median when generating
the four institutional states.8 The ‘stateness-first’ dummy is significant at conventional lev-
els and consistently negative in these specifications (see, e.g., Appendix Figure C.1). Our
results are also similar when we categorize ‘high’ levels of democracy and impartial public
administration based on membership in the top two-thirds or top one-third of each mea-
sure. When we substitute Polyarchy with the dichotomous BMR democracy measure from
8The categories respectively represent 42 (low democracy–low capacity), 20 (high
democracy–low capacity), 11 (low democracy–high capacity), and 27 (high democracy–high
capacity) percent of observations.
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Boix et al. (2012) for constructing the institutional states, the coefficient on stateness-first
sequences remains negative but is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels.
Finally, as a means of comparing the relevance of our pre-categorized ‘stateness-first’
path with alternative sequences of institutional change, we use optimal matching and hierar-
chical clustering methods to more inductively identify groups of countries displaying similar
institutional-sequencing patterns (Blanchard, 2011). These methods consider countries’ en-
tire histories in terms of how they are placed in the four-fold state capacity–democracy
categorization scheme. The purpose of doing so is to assess whether the explanatory power
of the particular pattern that we have defined as ‘stateness-first’ is eclipsed by other, more
refined institutional-sequencing patterns that are prevalent in the data. When sorting coun-
tries into four groups using Ward’s clustering method, the groups tend to fall along the
distinction of ‘stateness-first’ and ‘democracy first’ sequences. Adding these inductively
identified sequence groups to our regressions does not have a major impact on the standard
errors of the estimate; the negative association between stateness-first sequences and growth
holds and remains statistically significant.
In sum, the analysis reported in this section—directly incorporating historical sequences
of institutional change—provides some evidence that building state capacity before democ-
ratization, if anything, is associated with slower subsequent economic development.
5 Conclusion
We have scrutinized, criticized, and tested implications following from the so-called
stateness-first argument. While different variants of the stateness-first argument have been
forcefully and convincingly put forward by prominent scholars such as Huntington (1968)
and Fukuyama (2014a), our analysis suggests that these arguments may not be correct, at
least when it comes to explaining patterns of economic development. We have highlighted
how these arguments rely on several quite strong assumptions about the causal linkages be-
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tween democracy, state capacity, and growth. Further, we elaborated on how the argument
is ambiguous when it comes to specifying the proper counterfactual conditions of a state
experiencing the purportedly beneficial stateness-first sequence of institutional development.
Using new data on countries from across the world, and with time series extending from
1789–2016, we find no systematic support for the stateness-first argument on economic de-
velopment. The lack of empirical support for the argument appears despite our testing of
different empirical implications, proxying for different plausible counterfactual conditions,
and using several statistical methods and measures. Indeed, some specifications—notably
those explicitly considering the sequencing of institutional changes—find indications that
experiencing state-building prior to democratization is related to slower subsequent growth.
Our findings have several important implications for future research. First, one obvious
and intriguing extension of this analysis is to test whether stateness-first sequences matter
differently for other proposed outcomes of relevance, such as clientelism, civil conflict, or even
the survival of democracies after the initial transition has been made. Absent systematic tests
we cannot exclude the possibility that stateness-first transitions have important effects on
other outcomes. Our preliminary analysis on several alternative outcomes in Appendix D do
not provide much support for the notions that stateness-first transitions mitigate corruption
or clientelism or enhance human development. However, we do find indications in this
preliminary analysis that such transitions mitigate the risk of civil war. Second, our findings
might suggest that other types of ‘institutionalist explanations’ that make strong claims
about the role of deep institutional histories for economic development (prominent examples
being Evans and Rauch, 1999; Acemoglu, 2001)—but rely on rough proxy indicators of
historical institutions or measuring contemporary institutions and assuming that these have
persisted across decades or centuries—should be more closely scrutinized by using refined
and direct measures of different historical institutions. Third, our discussion of the different
counterfactual comparisons required to draw inferences about the effects of stateness-first
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sequences should inform research designs and theorizing in future studies of institutional
sequencing.
Our findings also have potential policy implications, as they speak to long-standing de-
bates over development policy and institution building with ramifications for millions of
people across the world. For instance, our findings do not support the widespread notion
that foreign development aid needs to be channeled towards building state institutions before,
e.g., holding multi-party elections, if the ultimate goal is to ensure economic development.
The notion that democracy is unsuitable in contexts where weaker state institutions prevail,
such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia or the Middle East, is not uncommon in policy cir-
cles. If democratization is anticipated to come at the cost of a stagnant economy, then foreign
ministries, international organizations, and aid agencies may find it preferable to continue to
support authoritarian strongmen, and postpone the promotion of democracy until the dis-
tant future when state institutions are (hopefully) built and order is ensured. If, however, the
trade-off between democratization and economic development is non-existent, policymakers
may rather want to abandon the current strongman and work harder to promote democracy.
Our findings provide some optimistic assessments for organizations, opposition movements,
and other actors who want to promote democracy in countries where state administrations
are currently far from the Weberian ideal.
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Online Appendices for “Stairways to Denmark”
A Additional panel regressions
In this Appendix we present additional panel specifications than those presented in the
paper. We start out by showing results for models using annualized GDP per capita growth
as the dependent variable instead of Ln GDP per capita. The eight leftmost columns of
Table 1 presents split-sample tests—separating on the median sample value on the impartial
and rule-following bureaucracy (v2clrscpt) measure.9 The five rightmost columns contain
interaction tests, interacting different measures of democracy and state capacity. Since GDP
per capita growth is continuous and close to normally distributed, all models in Table 1 are
OLS with country- and year fixed effects with country-year as unit of analysis. As we remark
in the paper, controlling for country-fixed effects is important since it accounts for different
time-invariant features, such as geographic or cultural factors, that may influence both the
institutional make-up of a country and growth (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2008). The year-fixed
effects account for (linear or more complex) global time trends and short-term shocks to
growth and institutional features. We also control for ln GDP per capita to account for
convergence effects (e.g., Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004). Errors are clustered by country to
mitigate concerns about serial correlation influencing the uncertainty estimates.
Model 1 (‘low-capacity sample’) and Model 2 (‘high-capacity sample’), regresses five-year
forward lagged growth outomes (i.e., GDP per capita growth from t+4 to t+5, on Polyarchy
and covariates at t. Thus, we here focus on shorter-term effects than for most models
presented in the paper. The Polyarchy coefficient is positive in the high-capacity sample
and negative in the low-capacity sample, in line with predictions from the ‘stateness-first’
argument. However, as for the main specifications in the paper, Polyarchy fails to achieve
9This median (0.0101) concerns all observations entering Models 1 and 2 combined. The first and third
quartile values—which demarcate the samples in Models 5 and 6—are -1.014 and 0.978, respectively.
i
conventional levels of significance in any of the two models. Models 1–2 only measures GDP
per capita growth for one given year, and a five-year lag may be insufficient to capture
possible longer-term developmental effects of democracy (although extant work suggests
that even slags of about three years may be sufficient; see Papaioannou and Siourounis,
2008). Thus, Models 3–4 use as dependent variable the average annual growth rate over the
entire twenty-year period after the independent variables are measured.10 The Polyarchy
coefficients is fairly comparable size in the low-capacity samples, but attenuated and even
further from conventional levels of statistical significance in the high-capacity sample.
Models 5–6 replicate Models 1–2, but splitting on the lowest- (Model 5) and highest
quartile observations (Model 6). While the point estimates suggest a positive effect in the
very high capacity sample and a negative in the very low capacity sample, Polyarchy is not
significant even at the 10% level in any specification. Models 7–8 again replicate Models
1–2, with the dichotomous (BMR) measure Boix et al. (2012). The relationship between
democracy and growth is estimated to be positive, but is statistically insignificant in both
samples. In sum, the split sample tests do not support the notion that democracy is more
tightly linked to economic development in high-capacity states than in low capacity states
(nor vice versa, cf. Knutsen, 2013).
Yet, split sample specifications are relatively inefficient for testing the hypothesis that the
effect of democracy hinges on the level of state capacity, estimating the relationship using
subsets of observations. Thus, Models 9–13 are interaction specifications run on the full
set of observations. Model 9 interacts Polyarchy with v2clrspct and uses growth in t + 5 as
dependent variable. Model 10 includes the same interaction term, but uses average annual
growth over the subsequent twenty years as dependent variable. Model 11 adds additional
covariates to Model 10 that might affect both growth and institutional features, namely
10The samples are truncated due to the twenty year lags, but we maintain the same cut-off on v2clrscpt
(0.0101) to ensure comparable classifications.
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(Ln) population size, civil war, and natural resource dependence. Models 12 and 13 also use
twenty-year growth as dependent variable, but employ, respectively, measures of corruption
(v2x corr) and clientelism (v2psprlnks) as proxies for state capacity. None of these models
yield evidence of any systematic interaction between democracy, on the one hand, and an
impartial public administration, corruption, and clientelism, on the other.
Yet, the models in Table A.1 arguably do not offer precise tests of the effects of experi-
encing the specific sequence of state building before democratic transition. Thus, we shift
to panel regressions considering the existing or past level of state capacity at the point of
transition, using the BMR measure. Models 1–2, Table A.2 compare years of democratic
transitions to all non-democratic country-years in, respectively, low and high-capacity states,
using the median sample-value on v2clrscpt from Table A.1 as cut-off. The dependent vari-
ables is average annual growth rate over the following 20 years. Models 3–4 are similar split
sample tests, but where average growth rate of the preceding 20 years is controlled for (thus
resembling a difference–in–differences set-up).
One of these tests suggest that democratization has a systematically stronger link to
growth in high-capacity states; the point estimates are larger for the low-capacity samples,
but are highly uncertain in all specifications. Models 5–6, which control for growth over the
preceding 20 years, are interaction specifications where the democratic transition dummy is
multiplied with v2clrscpt. Models 7–8 replicate Models 5–6, but substitute v2clrscpt score
at time of democratic transition with the historical average in the ten years preceding the
transition. Models 9–10 replicate Model 6, but use the measures of corruption and clien-
telism, respectively, instead of v2clrscpt. None of these specifications suggest that democratic
transitions are more detrimental to economic growth in contexts where the state has (or has
had) a comparatively low level of capacity at (or before) transition. All interaction terms
are insiginificant, even at 10%.
Finally, many contributions proposing that not building state capacity before opening up
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for mass politics has detrimental effects mainly focuses on expansions of the suffrage (from
a narrow set of elites) to covering broader segments of the population (see, e.g., Fukuyama,
2014a). In order to test, more specifically, whether extensive suffrage is systematically less
conducive to growth in contexts of low state capacity, we re-ran the OLS specifications from
Table 1 in the paper—thus using Ln GDP per capita measured 20 years after the covariates
as dependent variable—but substituting the Polyarchy index of democracy with a variable
from V-Dem measuring the share of adults with voting rights (v2x suffr). Since the varible
is measured as a share, it extends from 0 to 1, and the distribution of the variable in our
sample is shown in Figure A.1.
0
5
10
15
20
de
ns
ity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
suffrage
Figure A.1 – Distribution of suffrage, 1789–2017.
(Dotted line represents the median; solid line indicates the mean.)
The results for suffrage are reported in Table A.3. For the split-sample specifications—
where the sample is split according to the median value on our measure of impartial and
rule-following administration—the point estimates actually suggest a positive relationship
between suffrage and income measured 20 years after in the low-capacity sample (Model 1)
vi
Table A.3 – Tests using share of adult population with suffrage as measure for democracy,
with Ln GDP p.c. as dependent variable.
1 2 3 4 5
Sample: LC HC Full Full Full
Dep var measured in year t+ 20 t+ 20 t+ 20 t+ 20 t+ 40
Suffrage 0.086 -0.016 0.041 -0.035 0.137*
(0.109) (0.068) (0.064) (0.094) (0.082)
Impartial public administration 0.002 -0.017 -0.013
(0.019) (0.030) (0.035)
Suffrage X IPA 0.029 0.042 0.040
(0.020) (0.028) (0.035)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.848*** 0.667*** 0.792*** 0.790*** 0.679***
(0.046) (0.059) (0.044) (0.043) (0.070)
Civil war -0.005
(0.039)
Resource dependence -0.007***
(0.002)
Ln Population 0.017
(0.048)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y
N 7983 8254 15677 10385 12391
R2 0.749 0.889 0.839 0.849 0.774
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Ln GDP p.c.
is dependent variable. OLS with country- and year fixed effects with errors clustered by country.
LC: Low capacity. HC: High capacity. Low vs High capacity is determined relative to median-sample
value on IPA for full sample for specification orresponding to Models 1 and 2, Table 1.
and a negative relationship in the high-capacity sample (Model 2). However, none of the
coefficients are close to being statistically significant. Likewise, neither of the interaction
specifications in Models 3 (benchmark), 4 (additional controls), or 5 (income measured 40
years after covariates) display a clear interaction between suffrage and state capacity. In
conclusion, similar to the tests on broader measures of electoral democracy, tests focusing
on suffrage do not provide any support for the stateness-first argument.
vii
B Alternative matching models
In this appendix, we display additional matching models mentioned, but not reported,
in the paper. More specifically, we first report a table displaying variations of Model 1,
Table 2 (with Ln GDP p.c. measured in t + 20 as outcome). In these models, which are
estimated with Coarsened Exact Matching (Iacus et al., 2012), we alter the operationalization
used for coding democratic transitions, testing median Polyarchy (applying the 10-year rule
discussed in the paper, requiring that the country remained democratic at least 10 years
after the initial transition), transition on the dichotomous BMR measure (with and without
the ten-year rule), as well as a dummy registering whether or not a majority of the adult
population has suffrage rights (with and without the ten-year rule).
The overall pattern is similar to the models reported in the paper, namely one of null
results. But there is, in fact, a positive relationship (significant at 5%) between state capacity
at the time of democratization when using the suffrage measure and applying the 10-year
rule in Model 5. While this result is in line with the stateness-first argument, we note that
the result is sensitive to minor tweaks to the specification, also when using suffrage expansion
as the demarcator of democratization episodes (such as not employing the 10-year rule, in
Model 4). More generally, this result contrasts with results from the numerous other tests
that we have conducted. As such, this single result does not alter our main conclusion
regarding the (lack of) validity of the stateness-first argument when it comes to explaining
economic development.
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We further probed the sensitivity of the results by employing a very different matching
approach. More specifically, we re-estimate models 3 - 5 from table 2 using entropy balancing
(EB) (Hainmueller, 2012) instead of CEM. In brief, EB uses a re-weighting scheme that
ensures adjustments in inequalities between treatment and control groups with respect to
the first, second, and potentially higher moments of the covariate distribution. Recent
research indicates that EB, on a number of dimensions, outperforms traditional approaches
to matching based estimating the propensity score by maximum likelihood (see, e.g., Zhao
and Percival, 2016; Harvey et al., 2017). Furthermore, while EB requires a dichotomous
treatment variable, it does not demand the categorization of the covariates, which often
involves an element of arbitrariness, including in our setting. Thus, there are clear benefits
to using EB also when it comes to analyzing the stateness-first argument.
Nevertheless, EB cannot replicate that tests performed by Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 of
the paper. With CEM, observations that does not find a match within the bins of categories
across treatment and control groups are discarded. In effect, countries experiencing democ-
ratization are matched with countries that are equal within that same year/time period, and
all other comparisons are discarded. With EB, however, observations are not discarded.
Without further restrictions in our panel set-up, country i experiencing democratization in
year t would, effectively, be compared with itself in t-k and t+k. Furthermore, country i
in year t would also be compared to country j, which is not experiencing democratization,
perhaps because it is already democratic, in year t, year t-k, and year t+k. Some of these
issues could be alleviated, for example by removing all observations from a country after
democratization or all observations X years before and after democratization. Preliminary
tests (not reported) suggest that results are very sensitive to such specification choices, but
overall providing little evidence in support of the stateness-first argument. Yet, since there
are multiple issues and arbitrariness involved with selecting a specific subset of years for
countries that do not experience democratization as well as a sensible subset of autocratic
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years for a country that later experiences democratization, we do not focus on these results.
(These issues are avoided with CEM, because the sample is effectively restricted as a part
of the matching procedure.)
Table B.2 – Entropy Balancing
(1) (2) (3)
Ln GDP 20 years after
democratization
Ln GDP in 2004
Bureaucracy-level −0.04 0.04 −0.04
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Ln GDP pc at democratization 0.87∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.11)
Year 0.005∗∗ −0.002 −0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.05 −0.16 −0.50
(0.18) (0.35) (0.45)
Constant −7.33∗∗ 8.76∗∗ 9.26∗
(2.78) (3.00) (3.57)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Comparison: Democratizers Democratizers Democratizers
Democratization rule: After 20 years of Aut. First only First only
Observations 99 80 46
R2 0.85 0.85 0.88
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.83 0.86
Notes: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Standard error in parentheses.
But, this is not a problem for replicating Models 3-5 from Table 2 by using EB. These
models already restrict the sample to country-years when democratization happens. The EB-
versions of these models are thus presented in Table B.2. In all three models, bureaucracy-
level is matched on GDP per capita, year, ethnic fractionalization, and regional dummies. In
Models 1 and 3, the coefficient for impartial and rule-following bureaucracy is negative, while
it iss positive in Model 2. In all models the association is highly uncertain, and statistically
insignificant at conventional levels.
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C Alternative sequencing models
In this appendix, we include a table with some of the different robustness tests that we ran
on our sequencing specifications. Here, we present results altering the operationalizations of
democratic transition as well as the transition from low to high capacity. In the benchmark
specifications presented in the paper, we opted for splitting both Polyarchy and the impartial
and rule-following administration measures at their medians, ensuring fairly balanced sub-
samples of observations in different ‘institutional states’ (low democracy–low capacity, high
democracy–low capacity, etc.) and also aiming to set thresholds that appropriately captures
extant arguments about stateness-first sequences. For instance, we highlighted the impor-
tance of not setting the bar for ‘democratization’ too high, as existing studies mainly focus
on the introduction of elementary aspects of mass politics (e.g., opening up for multi-party
competition or extending the franchise beyond elites).
Overall, the results in Table C.1 show that the statistical significance of the relation-
ship between stateness-first sequences and subsequent economic development is sensitive to
such opertationalization choices. While results are quite similar to our benchmark—which
finds a negative and significant stateness-first coefficient—when using a mean cut-off rule
for Polyarchy and the impartial public administration measure (see also Figure C.1), the
results change for alternative measurement strategies. For instance, the relationship is indis-
tinguishable from zero once we use the BMR measure to identify democratization episodes
rather than V-Dem’s Polyarchy measure. However, the sign of the relationship is consistently
negative. Hence, what is also consistent across these (and other) specifications is that there
is no evidence that stateness-first sequences correspond with higher, subsequent economic
growth.
Finally, we tested similar sequencing specifications, but focusing on suffrage instead of
overall democraitzation. Once again, we leverage the extensive coding of suffrage from V-
xii
Dem, and test different ways of operationalizing high/low suffrage (mean and median in the
1789–2016 sample). While the coefficient for the resulting stateness-first dummy—registering
sequences where countries achieve high state capacity before extensive suffrage—is positive
in the twospecifications using the median values as cut-offs. Yet, the stateness-first dummy
never achieves statistical significance even at the 10% level. In contrast, the models that
employ the mean values as cut-offs report a negative and (weakly) significant stateness first
dummy. Thus, although results are less clear when focusing on suffrage rather than composite
democracy measures, there is no evidence supporting the stateness-first argument from any
of the analyses.
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Figure C.1 – Estimates for ‘stateness-first’ transitions, for varying leads.
(Cut-offs for institutional variables based on mean values in sample.)
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Table C.1 – Alternative measurements of democracy and state capacity when operationalizing
stateness-first transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Democracy measure Polyarchy BMR BMR Polyarchy Polyarchy
Cut-off rule for continuous
measures of state cap./democ. mean median mean top two-thirds top third
Stateness-first -0.516*** -0.49 -0.085 -0.514*** -0.169
-0.18 -0.671 -0.455 -0.154 -0.25
Low dem., high cap. -0.043 0.021 -0.01 0.003 -0.065
-0.06 -0.044 -0.049 -0.069 -0.065
High dem., low cap. -0.036 0.039 0.03 -0.077* -0.028
-0.042 -0.045 -0.041 -0.046 -0.031
High dem., high cap. -0.003 0.035 0.002 -0.024 -0.004
-0.053 -0.049 -0.058 -0.065 -0.052
Σlow dem., low cap. 0 0 0 0.001 0
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
Σlow dem., high cap. 0.002 0.004** 0.004*** 0.003 0.003*
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
Σhigh dem., low cap. 0 0.008*** 0.007*** 0 0.002
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Σhigh dem., high cap. 0.003** 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002**
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Ln GDP p.c. 0.770*** 0.761*** 0.761*** 0.779*** 0.777***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.042) (0.048) (0.044)
Ln GDP p.c. at transition 0.063*** 0.067 0.022 0.058*** 0.023
-0.023 -0.086 -0.059 -0.022 -0.035
Polyarchy -0.150 -0.221** -0.217* -0.099 -0.166
(0.133) (0.111) (0.113) (0.109) (0.126)
Impartial administration 0.047 0.026 0.036 0.019 0.044
(0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
Polyarchy x Impartial adm. -0.040 0.019 0.005 0.019 -0.018
(0.052) (0.049) (0.050) (0.047) (0.048)
Civil War 0.011 0.005 0.002 0.011 0.011
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Resource dependence -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Ln population 0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.008 0.008
(0.045) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.045)
Intercept 1.546*** 1.677*** 1.660*** 1.387** 1.431**
(0.569) (0.578) (0.527) (0.546) (0.581)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
N 10073 10071 10071 10073 10073
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. OLS regressions with
Ln GDP p.c. in t+20 as dependent variable. Year dummies omitted.
Country-year is unit. Errors are clustered by country.
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Table C.2 – Suffrage and state capacity, operationalizing stateness-first transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Cut-off rule for continuous
measures of state cap./suffr. median median mean mean
Stateness-first 0.168 0.354 -0.356* -0.605*
(0.251) (0.348) (0.201) (0.320)
Low dem., high cap. 0.059* -0.032 0.057 -0.079
(0.034) (0.044) (0.048) (0.085)
High dem., low cap. 0.095** 0.143** 0.015 -0.057
(0.043) (0.069) (0.046) (0.078)
High dem., high cap. 0.119** 0.196** 0.061 -0.056
(0.049) (0.081) (0.053) (0.094)
Σlow dem., low cap. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Σlow dem., high cap. -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Σhigh dem., low cap. 0 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Σhigh dem., high cap. 0.002** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.788*** 0.782*** 0.796*** 0.797***
(0.044) (0.040) (0.043) (0.039)
Ln GDP p.c. at transition -0.009 -0.027 0.039 0.064
(0.034) (0.047) (0.025) (0.041)
Suffrage -0.180 -0.022
(0.114) (0.121)
Impartial administration -0.006 0.025
(0.030) (0.036)
Suffrage x Impartial adm. 0.029 -0.011
(0.031) (0.036)
Civil War -0.007 -0.002
(0.037) (0.039)
Resource dependence -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Ln population -0.001 0.012
(0.041) (0.036)
Intercept 1.194*** 1.354*** 1.250*** 1.399***
(0.296) (0.525) (0.297) (0.476)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
N 15627.000 10385.000 15627.000 10385.000
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS regressions with
Ln GDP p.c. in t+20 as dependent variable. Year dummies omitted.
Country-year is unit; Errors are clustered by country.
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D Preliminary analysis on alternative outcomes
As we discuss in the paper, various formulations of the stateness-first argument have
been proposed to explain a range of outcomes. As we also note in the paper, our theoretical
discussion on the strong assumptions of the stateness-first argument, and our discussions on
how to appropriately consider counter-factual scenarios when designing tests, pertain to a
number of these outcomes. However, the more specific design of the most appropriate tests
(e.g., in terms of choosing the right estimator and the lag-specification on the dependent
variable) could certainly differ for other reasons across outcomes. Empirically, the focus of
our paper was put squarely on economic development, testing specifications that assess both
the medium- and long-term consequences for economic growth. We thus reiterate that the
fact that our findings do not corroborate the stateness-first argument for economic develop-
ment, should not lead to strong conclusions on the irrelevance of stateness-first sequences
for any outcome. Indeed, this word of caution is borne out by the preliminary analysis con-
tained in this appendix, where some tests—for instance when civil war onset is the dependent
variable—reveal patterns that are more in line with the stateness-first argument than the
results we find for economic development. That being said, also the majority of models that
we have tested for alternative, relevant outcomes discussed in the extant literature fail to
provide clear evidence in line with the stateness-first argument.
While it is infeasible for us to carefully treat each and every interesting outcome poten-
tially affected by stateness-first sequences within the scope of one article, we present some
preliminary results for a handful of outcomes in the tables below. For the sake of easing
comparability, we present these results following the same model specification templates as
we do for economic development in the paper. This choice—in addition to the absence of
numerous robustness tests—is also why we consider these results to be preliminary; we are
likely not identifying the optimal specification for each outcome. For instance, when study-
xvii
ing civil war onset, we should perhaps have used a logit estimator rather than a fixed effects
OLS specification and the 20-year lags is perhaps too long when assessing the relationship
with civil war. Thus, we underscore that more careful empirical studies of the stateness-first
argument for alternative outcomes should be considered fruitful topics for future research.
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Figure D.1 – Distribution Ln infant mortality rate, 1900–2015.
(Dotted line represents the median; solid line indicates the mean.)
All this being said, Table D.1 presents fixed effects OLS specifications akin to those in
Models 1–3, Table 1 for, respectively, Ln infant mortality rate, Programmatic vs. clientelist
linkages between candidates/parties and citizens/voters, and, civil war onset. Data for all
these dependent variables are taken from the V-Dem dataset, version 7.1. To reiterate, these
specifications test the core assumption that democracy functions better in producing ‘good
outcomes’ in contexts of high state capacity than in contexts of low, controlling for initial
income level as well as country- and year fixed effects.
The findings vary according to the outcome. For Ln infant mortality rate—the perhaps
most widely used proxy for human development in the literature—we actually replicate the
xviii
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Figure D.2 – Distribution programmatic vs clientelist linkages, 1789–2016.
(Dotted line represents the median; solid line indicates the mean.)
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Figure D.3 – Distribution Corruption Index, 1789–2017.
(Dotted line represents the median; solid line indicates the mean.)
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interaction results produced by Hanson (2015); according to Model 3, democracies have a
systematically more benevolent effect in reducing infant mortality the lower state capacity is.
This runs counter to the expectation related to the stateness-first argument. Adding to this,
a sequencing specification—resembling the specification in Model 2, Table 3 of the paper,
but with Ln infant mortality as dependent variable—finds that stateness-first sequences
are systematically associated with higher subsequent mortality rates. This latter result is
reported in Table .
Yet, neither the split-sample specifications (Models 1 and 2, which do not account for level
of state capacity other than when dividing the sample in two) nor the CEM matching models,
presented further below, on features of the bureaucracy at time of democratic transition
and long-term reductions in infant mortality, find any systematic pattern. Nonetheless,
there at least is no evidence supporting the stateness-first argument for this proxy of human
development.
Next, we discussed in the paper how benevolent effects on reducing clientelism and cor-
ruption are proposed as key mechanisms linking stateness-first sequences to long-term devel-
opment, for instance in Fukuyama (2014a). Yet, we find no evidence supporting the notion
that democratization/democracy bears a stronger (or weaker) relationship with future clien-
telism or corruption in low-capacity contexts than in high-capacity contexts, neither from
panel-, CEM, nor sequencing analysis.
In contrast, we do find indications from the panel specifications comporting with the
notion that democracy is associated with increased risk of civil war onset in low-capacity
contexts (Model 7,Table D.1). This relationship is non-existent in high-capacity contexts
(Model 8). Further, the interaction specification (Model 9) finds that the relationship be-
tween democracy and civil war risk is systematically reduced as state capacity increases.
While we once again remind that we regard these as preliminary results, and caution against
reading too much into them, they do suggest that stateness-first type of arguments might be
xx
Table D.1 – OLS Fixed effects regressions with various outcomes measured in t+ 20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable Ln infant mortality rate Programmatic vs Clientelist links Civil war onset
Sample LC HC Full LC HC Full LC HC Full
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Polyarchy -0.037 -0.051 0.185 0.018 -0.040 -0.097 0.058* -0.003 0.023
(0.147) (0.163) (0.139) (0.411) (0.379) (0.363) (0.034) (0.011) (0.017)
Impartial Pub. Admin. 0.058** 0.080 0.003
(0.027) (0.053) (0.003)
Polyarchy X IPA -0.280*** 0.051 -0.010**
(0.047) (0.145) (0.005)
Ln GDP per capita -0.268*** -0.359*** -0.339*** 0.172 -0.067 0.129 0.001 -0.009 -0.002
(0.074) (0.095) (0.064) (0.143) (0.187) (0.114) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 4473 5300 9799 7035 7310 14343 4003 4428 8457
R2 0.823 0.916 0.881 0.111 0.258 0.181 0.025 0.027 0.013
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Constant, country- and year dummies omitted. Errors clustered by country.
LC: Low capacity. HC: High capacity, relative to median value on IPA (-0.090) for full sample Models 1 and 2, Table 1.
Data for all dependent variables (see top row) are taken from the V-Dem dataset.
of more relevance to mitigating internal conflict than to other outcomes.
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Table D.5 – Comparing various outcomes measured in t+ 20, operationalizing stateness-first
transitions
(1) (2) (3)
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Dep. variable Ln Infant mortality Clientelism Corruption
Stateness-first 0.251** -0.197* -0.006
(0.115) (0.114) (0.008)
Low dem., high cap. -0.015 0.131 -0.001
(0.051) (0.089) (0.007)
High dem., low cap. -0.014 0.016 -0.003
(0.022) (0.071) (0.006)
High dem., high cap. 0.010 0.019 -0.005
(0.034) (0.084) (0.007)
Σlow dem., low cap. 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Σlow dem., high cap. -0.003 0.001 -0.000*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Σhigh dem., low cap. 0.003 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Σhigh dem., high cap. -0.004*** 0.006*** -0.000**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln Infant mortality 0.543***
(0.041)
Clientelism 0.483***
(0.042)
Corruption 0.404***
(0.036)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
N 8442 17567 18379
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. OLS regressions.
Year dummies omitted; Country-year is unit; Errors are clustered by country.
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